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I. INTRODUCTION
This Essay considers inequality of deservingness as both an organizing
principle and a pathology of antipoverty program design in the United
States. Antipoverty programs in the United States target specific types of

*
© 2022 Ariel Jurow Kleiman. Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles. Thank you to Larry Alexander and Steven Smith for inviting me to participate in the
University of San Diego Institute for Law & Philosophy Conference on Inequality, to Bert
Lazerow for insightful comments, and to all of the symposium attendees for engaging with the
piece.
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households and individuals, including families with children and workers
engaged in the formal labor market.1 Indeed, for the past quarter century,
many public benefit programs have prioritized households that display
both characteristics, that is, working families with children. These programs
draw lines around those who do and do not “deserve” support based broadly
on notions of faultlessness, reciprocity, and work effort.
The U.S. tax system delivers the bulk of federal antipoverty cash support
via the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Child Tax Credit (CTC).
Unlike in traditional welfare programs, which entail lengthy application
processes often administered by caseworkers, EITC and CTC recipients
claim these refundable tax credits simply by filing an income tax return.
Here arises the problem that this Essay explores: A federal income tax return
is poorly equipped to evaluate recipients’ deservingness. The word
“deserving” here means deserving of antipoverty support according to the
distributive justice norms that most likely inform antipoverty program
design. I am not commenting on people’s inherent value or worthiness.2
The Form 1040 Individual Income Tax Return can only ascertain a few
pieces of information about a filer: Does she work in the formal labor
market? Does she have closely related children who live with her most of
the year? What is her earned income? Each of these questions is answered
with a simple yes/no or a numerical value. There is little nuance. The tax
return’s relative simplicity3 offers many positives both for recipients and for
the government. Nonetheless, the information gathered does not perfectly
map onto notions of deservingness that underlie U.S. antipoverty programs.
These deservingness norms are more nuanced that the tax return allows. This
mismatch leads to the exclusion of people who would be considered
deserving under the normative principles that inform antipoverty program
1. I have written about these patterns in previous work. See, e.g., Ariel Jurow
Kleiman, Impoverishment by Taxation, 170 U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022); Ariel Jurow
Kleiman, Low-End Regressivity, 72 TAX L. R EV . 101 (2018) [hereinafter Low-End
Regressivity].
2. Moreover, a commitment to human dignity means that all people are worthy of
respect and protection from degradation, which requires a minimum standard of living and
access to basic needs. See ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG
TRADEOFF 16 (1975).
3. A tax return is simple compared to applications for non-tax public benefits, such
as Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits or Temporary Aid to
Needy Families (TANF). These applications require documentary proof of income and
expenses, as well as a telephone or in-person interview, among other potentially burdensome
requirements. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 273.2 (requiring SNAP applicants to “have a faceto-face interview with an eligibility worker at initial certification and at least once every
12 months thereafter”). Of course, many have critiqued the complexity of the Form 1040
and the tax filing process generally. Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Regulating
Tax Return Preparation, 58 B.C. L. REV. 152, 170–71 (2017). Relative to other public
benefit applications, however, such a criticism is less fitting.
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design, but who fail to demonstrate their deservingness in ways that are
visible on a Form 1040 Individual Income Tax Return.4
This Essay explores how the U.S. tax system—the primary mechanism for
distributing antipoverty cash benefits—is poorly suited to evaluating
recipients’ deservingness. In doing so, it defines and formalizes the concept
of inequality of deservingness, which is dyadic in nature. The first form
of such inequality is that of “true deservingness.” True deservingness is
somewhat abstract, arising from the distributive justice frameworks that
underlie antipoverty program design in the United States. In Part II, the
Essay briefly describes the major federal U.S. antipoverty programs, which
mostly target support to families with children, people with disabilities,
and workers. Working backwards, I then deduce various distributive justice
norms that serve as organizing principles for U.S. antipoverty policy. These
norms rest on notions of faultlessness, reciprocity, and work effort. The Essay
does not defend these norms, but merely identifies them. Inequality of
true deservingness refers to the fact that some people are considered
deserving of support under these various norms, while others are not.
The second form of inequality of deservingness that this Essay considers
is that of deservingness as determined by the public benefit system,
which I call “deemed deservingness.” Focusing on tax-administered benefits,
Part III starts by describing the information that a Form 1040 Individual
Income Tax Return gathers about households. This information is necessarily
limited; the tax return must be as simple as possible to ease filing for
most taxpayers. For instance, while a taxpayer can show whether they are
working—which is required to receive the EITC—those who are not working
cannot explain why they are not working. Some individuals will thus be
deemed deserving or undeserving without being able to provide full context
for their actions. As Part III explains, true deservingness and deemed
deservingness will not always align.
To provide greater texture to this discussion, I describe several taxpayers’
stories based on my former legal aid clients who were excluded from
cash antipoverty support. These stories are anonymized, slightly altered
4. Over-inclusion is also possible. For instance, imagine someone who is highly
capable, intelligent, and wealthy, but also lazy. She works very little during the year and
receives poverty-level earned income. She is able to live extravagantly by spending her
savings. However, she is eligible for the EITC because of her low earnings, despite the
fact that she would not be considered “deserving” under traditional deservingness norms.
(Assume she holds her savings mostly in cash, since investment income over $10,000
would make her ineligible for the EITC. IRC § 32(i).)

237

KLEIMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/29/2022 9:45 AM

amalgams of several clients I represented while directing the low-income
taxpayer clinic at Bet Tzedek Legal Service in Los Angeles.5
Inequality of deservingness is not inherently problematic. Antipoverty
programs often draw reasonable boundaries in order to incentivize certain
behaviors, limit costs, and encourage public support. It is the incongruity
of true deservingness and deemed deservingness that leads to negative
outcomes, including unprincipled exclusion of “deserving” individuals,
misaligned behavioral incentives, and reduced public support for antipoverty
programs.
The Essay ends by briefly considering whether reform is necessary and
discussing several alternative antipoverty program designs. I conclude that
the tax system is ill-equipped to provide inclusive benefits to all people who
fit deservingness norms. Policymakers should therefore expand non-tax
antipoverty programs to ensure that diverse programs exist to cover the
complex scenarios under which households might need support. In addition
to federal non-tax programs, I explore several local program models capable
of addressing highly individualized needs.
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part II describes the major federal
antipoverty programs in the United States and deduces the deservingness
norms that underlie their eligibility boundaries. It focuses on antipoverty
programs administered through the tax system, as these are the largest
means-tested cash transfer programs in the United States. Part III describes
who is deemed deserving under the tax system and explores how this deemed
deservingness fails to align perfectly with the deservingness norms described
in Part II. Part IV finishes by discussing the possible negative consequences
of such misalignment and considering several policy responses.
II. TRUE DESERVINGNESS
This Part explores various deservingness norms that serve as organizing
principles for U.S. antipoverty programs. For readers unfamiliar with the
safety net landscape, it starts by briefly describing the major federal cash
antipoverty programs. This Essay focuses in particular on transfer programs
administered through the tax system, since these are the largest meanstested cash programs in the United States. It then describes several distributional
frameworks that justify the broad categories of deservingness that U.S.
safety net programs seek to target. These frameworks include egalitarianism,
specifically the choice-chance principle, and reciprocity norms based on
work effort.

5.
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A. Antipoverty Program Landscape
The U.S. safety net is composed of a patchwork of programs each of
which seeks to provide support to a certain group of people. Broadly
speaking, the programs can be broken into two categories: antipoverty
programs and social insurance programs. This Essay focuses on the
former, since these programs are the ones for which deservingness plays
a larger role. Social insurance programs—e.g., unemployment insurance
and Social Security benefits—tend to reflect an insurance-premium model in
which eligibility is based on having paid into the program. Antipoverty
programs, on the other hand, target individuals and households based on
certain characteristics, such as income or the presence of children.
Antipoverty programs can then be subdivided into two types of support:
cash support and in-kind support. Cash benefits include the EITC and
CTC, as well as Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF). Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) provides means-tested cash support to people who are
elderly, blind, or disabled.6 Some local governments also provide General
Relief or General Assistance, although these programs are exceedingly
rare and quite meager.7
1. Programs in the Tax System
The tax system delivers cash support to low-income American families
through the EITC and CTC.8 The EITC is a refundable tax credit for working
taxpayers. The amount of benefits it provides varies dramatically based
on income and family size, with a maximum benefit in 2020 ranging
from $538 for taxpayers without qualifying children to $6,660 for
taxpayers with three or more qualifying children.9 Historically, childless
workers have received such a small EITC that the benefit does not even

6. 20 C.F.R. § 416.202.
7. Liz Schott & Misha Hill, State General Assistance Programs Are Weakening
Despite Increased Need, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (July 9, 2015), http://
www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-9-15pov.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQ58-RPD]
(noting the decline in size and scope of general assistance programs across states).
8. See Nada Eissa & Hilary Hoynes, Taxes and the Labor Market Participation of
Married Couples: The Earned Income Tax Credit, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1931, 1931 (2004).
9. I.R.S., PUB. 596, EARNED INCOME CREDIT 32–33 (2021), https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/p596.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6FJ-Q2MU].
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fully offset the federal taxes they pay.10 As a result, most EITC benefits
are paid to working families with children.11
Designed to encourage work, the EITC phases in based on a taxpayer’s
earned income. Taxpayers in the phase-in range receive a larger credit as
their incomes increase; those with lower income receive a smaller credit.
Recipients must work in the formal labor market in order to receive the
EITC. The EITC also phases out based on a taxpayer’s income and marital
status.12 The phase-out threshold is designed to target families living below
and just above the poverty line. Approximately one-in-five taxpayers claim
the EITC, including 44% of all taxpayers with children.13
The CTC provides a tax credit for taxpayers with children of up to
$2,000 per child in 2020.14 Like the EITC, the CTC’s benefits phase in
and out by income, but extend up to a much higher income level.15 Notably,
the CTC is only refundable based on the amount by which a taxpayer’s
income exceeds $2,500, and then only up to $1,400 per child.16 This income
threshold means that only working families are eligible to receive the CTC.
In 2021 only, Congress temporarily expanded both the CTC and the
childless EITC.17 With regard to the CTC, Congress temporarily removed the
credit’s earnings threshold so that taxpayers with no earnings could receive
the full credit amount.18 Congress also temporarily increased the credit
amount in 2021 to $3,000 per child, or $3,600 for children under 6 years
of age.19 For the EITC, Congress temporarily increased the maximum credit
for childless workers to roughly $1,500.20 This expansion marked the first

10. Low-End Regressivity, supra note 1.
11. See Tax Pol’y Ctr, EITC Distribution by Number of Qualifying Children (2020),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/eitc-distribution-number-qualifying-children
[https://perma.cc/SF7P-ZAZS] (providing that 97% of EITC benefits are paid to families
with children).
12. See I.R.C. § 32(b) (2021) (providing phase-in and phase-out percentages); CENTER
FOR BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 12 (2019), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/policybasics-eitc.pdf [https://
perma.cc/74ZE-RA3L].
13. Hilary Hoynes & Jesse Rothstein, Tax Policy Toward Low-Income Families 1 Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22080, 2016, http://www.nber.org/papers/
w2208 [https://perma.cc/L6WG-4V9E].
14. I.R.C. § 24(a), (h) (West 2021).
15. Id. at § 24(b), (h)(3).
16. Id. at § 24(d), (h)(6).
17. American Rescue Plan Act, P.L. 117-2, § 9621.
18. I.R.C. § 24(i) (West 2021).
19. Id. at § 24(i)(3).
20. CHUCK MARR, KRIS COX & ARLOC SHERMAN, BUILD BACK BETTER’S CHILD
TAX CREDIT CHANGES WOULD PROTECT MILLIONS FROM POVERTY—PERMANENTLY 7–8
(2021), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/11-11-21tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9TJ3HLP].
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time that the federal government provided significant cash support to childless
households.21
Recipients generally claim the EITC and CTC by filing a federal income tax
return each year.22 Taxpayers report two main informational inputs in
order to receive the credits: earned income and number of “qualifying
children.”23 A claimant need not provide proof of income or children unless
she is audited.
A taxpayer’s earned income tells the government both that the taxpayer
works in the formal labor market and whether the taxpayer has income
that is low enough or high enough to qualify for the credit. The child-claiming
rules are designed to determine which taxpayers are best suited to claim
which kids for purposes of the credits. In general, the rules require that a
claimant be closely related to the child (i.e. parent, grandparent, older sibling,
aunt/uncle), and that she live with the child for at least six months of the
year.24 Children who do not live with a close enough relative for a sufficient
time during the year will be excluded from benefits under both credits.25
Other factors are relevant to program eligibility as well, perhaps most notably,
family members’ immigration statuses.26
2. Programs Outside the Tax System
Outside of the Tax Code, TANF is the only other federal cash support
program that targets low-income families. State governments administer
TANF programs via the receipt of a federal block grant, pursuant to strict
federal guidelines. A recipient must have children (or be pregnant) in

21. I discuss these changes and their significance in greater detail at Revolutionizing
Redistribution: Tax Credits and the American Rescue Plan, 131 YALE L.J. FORUM 535
(2021).
22. The IRS expanded CTC availability to non-filers for tax year 2021 to enable
them to claim the temporarily expanded CTC. See I.R.S., IR-2021-129, IRS Unveils
Online Tool to Help Low-Income Families Register for Monthly Child Tax Credit Payments
(June 14, 2021), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-unveils-online-tool-to-help-low-incomefamilies-register-for-monthly-child-tax-credit-payments.
23. I.R.C. §§ 32(c), 24(b), (c) (West 2021).
24. I.R.C. § 152(c) (West 2021).
25. I address this problem in detail in Jacob Goldin & Ariel Jurow Kleiman, Whose
Child? Improving Child-Claiming Rules in Safety-Net Programs, 131 YALE L.J. 1719 (2022).
26. E.g. I.R.C. § 32(m) (West 2021) (requiring EITC recipients to have a valid Social
Security Number).
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order to receive TANF benefits.27 Additionally, all states must impose
some form of work requirement on recipients.28 In nearly all states a family
becomes ineligible for benefits if one parent fails to work some minimum
number of hours per week.29 Thus, despite their various differences, TANF
is similar to refundable tax credits in that it targets working families with
children. Unlike the EITC and CTC, participation in training and education
programs can qualify someone to receive benefits, although there are many
restrictions on the extent of such eligibility.30 Due to work requirements
and other eligibility rules—such as a five-year federal cap on benefits—
over three-quarters of families in poverty do not receive TANF benefits.31
The final major means-tested cash-support program is SSI. The Social
Security Administration (SSA) administers SSI for low-income individuals
who are aged, blind, or disabled.32 SSI provides vital support to millions
of individuals who cannot otherwise support themselves.33 SSI benefits totaled
$794 per month in 2021.34 In order to receive SSI, claimants below the age
of 65 who are not blind must have a documentable disability that prevents
them from working.35
All other federal antipoverty programs are administered as in-kind benefits,
including the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, also
known as food stamps), Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women,
Infants & Children (WIC), and Medicaid.36 For instance, SNAP provides
funds that can only be used to purchase certain foods. Medicaid provides
health insurance. These in-kind support programs are often larger and
entail fewer restrictions than cash-support programs. For instance, both
SNAP and Medicaid do not impose a work requirement for otherwise
27. See Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, BENEFITS.GOV, https://www.
benefits.gov/benefit/613 [https://perma.cc/9XCN-AX4N].
28. CENTER ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES (CBPP), POLICY BASICS: TEMPORARY
ASSISTANCE TO NEEDY FAMILIES 5 (2021), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/
files/7-22-10tanf2.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF66-L2YB].
29. Id.
30. See 64 C.F.R. § 261.30 (defining eligible work activities for TANF purposes to
include certain job-related education and training activities).
31. CBPP, supra note 28, at 6 (providing that “in 2019, only 23 families received
TANF for every 100 families in poverty”).
32. 20 C.F.R. § 416.202.
33. CONG. RES. S ERV., IN FOCUS: SUPPLEMENTAL S ECURITY INCOME 1 (2021),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10482 [https://perma.cc/4U7R-8CAQ].
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Robert Greenstein, Examining the Safety Net, Testimony of Robert Greenstein,
President, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Before the Human Resources Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Ways and Mean 17 (2015), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/
default/files/atoms/files/11-3-15bud-testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y3B-H2TT] (listing
safety net programs).

242

KLEIMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 23: 235, 2022]

9/29/2022 9:45 AM

Inequality of Deservingness
THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

qualifying low-income families with children. 37 Childless individuals,
however, may be categorically ineligible for these benefits or subject to
work requirements, with specific rules differing between programs and
states.38
Distinct from the EITC and CTC, most antipoverty programs are operated
as joint federal-state programs. As a result, application procedures differ
from state to state, or even county to county. Generally speaking, non-tax
antipoverty programs entail more onerous application processes compared to
tax-administered benefits. For instance, the applications for SNAP benefits and
TANF benefits often require information about market and nonmarket
income from all household members as well as assets, savings, and household
expenses.39 A claimant must then provide documentation to prove her
income and expenses as well as go through an interview process. 40
Applicants must also recertify periodically, often yearly but sometimes
more frequently.41
Qualifying for SSI is a difficult and confusing process involving medical
examination alongside proof of low-income status.42 Claims may take
years to resolve with finality and often involve several levels of administrative
review.43 The SSA conducts periodic disability review once every 3–7 years
to ensure that recipients remain eligible for benefits.44

37. See U.S. Dept. of Agric., SNAP Eligibility (2021), https://www.fns.usda.gov/
snap/recipient/eligibility [https://perma.cc/VV2R-8PCM] (last visited Nov. 22, 2021);
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (CBPP), INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAID 3 (2020),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/policybasics-medicaid_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/34AA-555V].
38. CBPP, supra note 37, at 2-3 (providing that childless individuals are ineligible
for Medicaid in certain states); U.S. Dept. of Agric., supra note 37.
39. U.S. Dept. of Agric., supra note 37.
40. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2 (“To determine eligibility, the application form must be
completed and signed, the household or its authorized representative must be interviewed, and
certain information on the application must be verified.”); L.A. County Dept. Health &
Hum. Serv., Applying for Cash Aid During COVID-19, https://dpss.lacounty.gov/content/
dam/dpss/documents/en/calworks/Applying%20for%20Cash%20Aid%20(Apps-Forms)%
20Eng1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X2Q-6KJZ] (last visited Nov. 22, 2021).
41. E.g., 7 C.F.R. § 273.2 (“[H]ouseholds must have a face-to-face interview with an
eligibility worker at initial certification and at least once every 12 months thereafter.”).
42. See Gay Gellhorn, Disability and Welfare Reform: Keep the Supplemental Security
Income Program but Reengineer the Disability Determination Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
961, 969–70 (1995).
43. Id. at 970–76 (explaining that the average successful SSI claim takes two years).
44. CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 33, at 2.
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A few key takeaways from this discussion are important. For one,
federal antipoverty programs tend to target benefits at families with children,
workers, and people with disabilities. Tax-administered programs, namely
the EITC and CTC, prioritize working families with children above other
kinds of households. Non-tax cash programs, TANF and SSI, target working
families with children and people with documentable disabilities. Nontax in-kind programs, like SNAP and Medicaid, place less emphasis on
work requirements for families with children but often still require work
for non-disabled childless adults. Additionally, non-tax programs typically
entail a more onerous application process compared to benefits provided
through the tax system.
B. Deservingness Norms in U.S. Antipoverty Programs
This section offers a broad flyover of normative frameworks that may
justify the current organization of federal antipoverty programs in the United
States. It does not list all possible distributive justice frameworks. It also
does not advocate for a particular framework.
Antipoverty programs in the United States target benefits to families with
children, workers, and people with disabilities who are not covered under
other disability insurance programs. Indeed, for many antipoverty programs,
the households that receive the bulk of support both work and have children.
Thus, deservingness norms that underlie this benefit structure must provide
justification for supporting children (and their parents by extension), people
with disabilities, and workers.
1. Faultlessness
Children and people with disabilities are the emblematic deserving poor.45
There are various reasons for these groups’ uncontroversial deservingness, but
perhaps the largest is the fact that they lack control over their circumstances.
They are innocent, or “faultless.”46
Limiting redistribution to only faultless individuals finds support in many
theories of justice, perhaps the most prominent of which is resource
egalitarianism or luck egalitarianism. Much egalitarian writing divides
people’s personal circumstances into those wrought by choice and those

45. MICHAEL KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: AMERICA’S ENDURING CONFRONTATION
WITH POVERTY 3 (2013).
46. Providing benefits only to faultless people avoids creating moral hazard. That
is, limiting support to those who lack control over their circumstances does not create
incentives for people to take unnecessary risks.
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arising from luck—the so called “choice-chance” principle.47 For instance, a
young child living in poverty has no control over her position. There is
essentially nothing she can do to change her financial circumstances.
Contrast this with an able-bodied adult who is capable of working, but who
lives in poverty because she chooses not to work, perhaps out of laziness.
Many prominent egalitarian commentators agree that the government ought to
redistribute to those in the first group but not to those in the second.48
In other words, the ultimate distribution of resources in society can reflects
people’s choices but should not reflect individuals’ bad luck.49
Other distributive justice frameworks draw a similar distinction, including
libertarian or sufficientarian theories of justice.50 Eric Mack has argued
that a minimal state may redistribute to the faultless poor.51 He likens such
redistribution to an imperiled hiker breaking into private property to save
himself from freezing to death.52
With regard to children, it is worth mentioning that children do not
receive most public benefits directly.53 Rather, parents and other caregivers
receive benefits that depend upon the fact that they care for children.54 The
expectation is that parents or caregivers will spend the funds to benefit their
children in some way, even if indirectly. Research confirms this expectation.55
Distributing benefits to parents makes good sense for practical administrative
reasons.

47. See Daniel Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 YALE
L.J. 2291, 2294–98 (2003); Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel Hemel, The Architecture of
a Basic Income, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 643–44 (2020).
48. Markovits, supra note 47, at 2294–98.
49. See Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV.
L. REV. 469, 474–75 (2007); Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 47, at 643–44.
50. See Eric Mack, Non-Absolute Rights and Libertarian Taxation, 23 SOC. PHIL.
& POL’Y 109, 109 (2006).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 114–15.
53. Certain in-kind benefits are given directly to children, like free education or free
school lunch. However, except in highly unusual cases, cash or near-cash benefits are not given
directly to children.
54. See generally Goldin & Jurow Kleiman, supra note 25 (discussing the rules that
determine which adults can claim which children).
55. See Arloc Sherman & Tazra Mitchell, Economic Security Programs Help LowIncome Children Succeed over Long Term, Many Studies Find, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES 3–5 (2017), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-17-17pov.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4UG3-9NZ5] (reviewing research on the long-term positive consequences for
children of income-support programs paid to parents).
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2. Work Effort and Reciprocity
Willingness to support low-income workers is more complicated than
the choice-chance principle. Research finds that people are more sympathetic
and generous to those described as “hard-working,”56 and that Americans do
not want to give others “something for nothing.” 57 Such sentiment is
stronger for fungible benefits like cash.58 This research suggests that people
are more willing to support those who contribute to society and put forth
some level of work effort. This sentiment can be described as a desire for
reciprocity. Put short, Americans don’t want to feel like suckers.
One could define reciprocity in myriad ways. For instance, reciprocity
might encompass any activity that contributes meaningfully to society,
such as taking care of family or friends, volunteering for local community
organizations, planting a public garden, and so forth. Alternatively, it might
be defined more narrowly by looking to formal market relations.59
In the context of work requirements built into antipoverty programs,
formal market relations dominate. To receive the EITC, for instance, a
claimant must have a job in the formal labor market. According to Lee
Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, American “[r]esistance to overt
redistribution of income is often fueled by the belief that the market
system reliably delivers distributionally fair outcomes to individuals, and
that, therefore, any shortfalls in outcomes can be readily connected to
personal shortfalls of character or effort.”60 In other words, many believe
that market income is a reliable proxy for effort and therefore that those
who earn little or no market income are simply not putting forth sufficient
effort or have some other personal flaw that prevents them from working.
Although not relevant to deservingness norms, it is important to note
that work requirements are also justified as a way to avoid creating work
disincentives.61 Whether or not work requirements are the best way to
achieve this goal is an empirical question and beyond the scope of this
discussion.

56. Andres Drenik & Ricardo Perez-Truglia, Sympathy for the Diligent and Demand
for Workfare 10–11 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 23659, 2017), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w2365 [https://perma.cc/967U-FYDL].
57. Greg M. Shaw, Changes in Public Opinion about the American Welfare State,
124 POL. SCI. Q. 627, 643 (2010).
58. Id.
59. See Elizabeth Anderson, Welfare, Work Requirements, and Dependant-Care,
21 J. APP. PHIL. 243, 244 (2004).
60. Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and
Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1101 (2016)
61. See Dennis Ventry, The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The Political History
of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1969–99, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 983, 995–96 (2000).
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Finally, it is worth reiterating that one’s work status alone is often not
sufficient to deem her deserving. Most antipoverty programs in the United
States only provide meaningful support to families with children or people
with disabilities. These programs provide at most minimal support to ablebodied childless adults, even if they are employed.62
* * *
To recap, antipoverty programs in the United States draw lines of
deservingness around low-income recipients, prioritizing children, workers,
and people with disabilities. These priorities find justification in theories
of distributive justice based on faultlessness and reciprocity. Americans
prefer to support those who are not responsible for their misfortune as well
as those who put forth effort to support themselves and their families. By
limiting support to these groups, the public can feel more confident that
we are not supporting shirkers and free riders.
III. DEEMED DESERVINGNESS
Any non-universal redistributive program requires some way to determine
whether one is eligible for support.63 Eligibility rules broadly track the
deservingness criteria described above. Actual eligibility, however, depends
on the administrative realities of the distribution system. Perhaps most
importantly, determining one’s deservingness depends on the information a
system can gather and easily corroborate about an applicant. Thus, true
deservingness and deemed deservingness will differ.
The tax system relies on self-reporting of relatively sparse information
in order to determine one’s tax burden as well as eligibility for the EITC
and CTC. This Part describes the information that taxpayers provide to
the IRS via the Form 1040 Individual Income Tax Return, showing that
there is limited overlap with notions of deservingness based on faultlessness
and reciprocity. It then tells several anonymized stories based on former
clients of mine who were excluded from cash support through the tax system
because their unique circumstances could not be reflected on a tax return.

62.
63.

I have written about this before, e.g. Low-End Regressivity, supra note 1.
Mack, supra note 50, at 140.
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I focus on the tax system because it is the largest distributor of nondisability-related cash antipoverty support in the United States.64 Outside
of the tax system, other antipoverty programs utilize a more holistic—and
thus more onerous—application process. As explained above, state-administered
SNAP and TANF programs collect significant information about applicants’
circumstances. They require proof of income and expenses as well as
telephone or in-person interviews.65 Depending on the specific rules that
apply in each state or county, these programs might be better able to tailor
distribution to households’ unique circumstances. However, they are also
costlier to administer and more burdensome for applicants.
A. Information Available to the IRS
Deservingness is multifaceted and complicated. It depends on one’s
effort, capacity, and intentions. Such things are difficult to discern even
in close interpersonal interactions. Not only does tax return filing rarely
entail human-to-human contact, but also the information provided by most
people is extremely limited.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) knows only a few limited things
about a household, including income, family size, work status, location,
and so forth. What’s more, it perceives these items with limited nuance. For
instance, although a tax return includes some information about family
size, it does not capture the nature of the care relationships within the
family. A parent might correctly list a child as a dependent even though
in reality a grandparent provides daily care and financial support for the
child.
This section describes the relevant information that the IRS is capable
of gathering via a Form 1040 Individual Income Tax Return.
Income Amount and Source. A taxpayer reports the amount and source
of income she earns each year. 66 Income sources include wages, selfemployment income, passive income (interest, dividends, rent, etc.), capital
gains, taxable retirement income, and Social Security benefits,67 among other
less common income sources. Taken all together, these figures provide

64. See JOINT COMM . TAX’N, ESTIMATES OF F EDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR
FISCAL YEARS 2020–2024, at 32–33 tbl.1 (2020), https://www.jct.gov/publications/2020/
jcx-23-20/ [https://perma.cc/8EV8-RDJT]; CBPP, supra note 28, at 2.
65. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
66. IRS, Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1 (2020), https://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf [https://perma.cc/JV3E-8W9S] (requesting income information
on lines 1–8).
67. Note that Social Security income is only subject to taxation if the taxpayer earns
above a certain income level.
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the amount of active and passive market income that a person earns in a
given year.
Marital Status. If a taxpayer is legally married, she must file as married,
although she can choose whether to file jointly or separately. There is only
a limited exception for married taxpayers who are living apart from their
spouse for the last six months of the year.68 In nearly all cases, therefore,
the IRS knows whether a taxpayer is married or unmarried.
Number of Children and Other Dependents. Taxpayers may report the
number of children who qualify as their dependents for tax purposes. A
taxpayer may do so in order to claim the CTC, the larger EITC for families
with children, the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit, Head of Household
filing status, or other tax benefits that are based on how many dependent
children one has. In order to qualify as a dependent, a child must be closely
related to the taxpayer (i.e. their child, grandchild, sibling, or niece/nephew)
and live in the taxpayer’s home for at least six months of the year.69 Note
that a child’s status as a dependent is not based on whether the taxpayer
financially supports her or whether the taxpayer provides daily care for
the child.
A taxpayer may also list other non-children dependents for various reasons,
for instance, to receive a credit for dependent care or to file as Head of
Household. Such “qualifying relative” dependents need not be closely
related to the taxpayer.70 In order to claim such dependents, the taxpayer
must provide over one-half of the individual’s support for the year.71
Other Information. A tax return might gather several other pieces of
pertinent information. For instance, although personal expenses are not
generally relevant to determining taxable income, taxpayers might report
certain kinds of expenses that qualify for tax benefits. Taxpayers can
report how much they spend on childcare, in order to qualify for one of
the childcare tax benefits. They might also report how much they pay in
student loans. If a taxpayer has significant medical expenses, she might
report them to take the medical expense deduction. Most other informational

68. I.R.S., Pub. 501, Dependents, Standard Deduction, and Filing Information, https://
www.irs.gov/publications/p501#en_US_2020_publink1000220780 [https://perma.cc/9HXY8AJA] (last visited Nov. 23, 2021) (under the heading “Considered Unmarried”).
69. IRS § 152(c). There is a limited exception that allows noncustodial parents to
claim a child for certain tax benefits if the custodial parent allows him to do so. This
exception does not apply for the purposes of the EITC.
70. IRC § 152(d)(2).
71. IRC § 152(d)(1)(C).
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inputs on a tax return are related to business or investment income and are
somewhat less relevant to a deservingness evaluation (apart from their
role in creating or reducing taxable income).
Missing Information. There are several pieces of information relevant
to deservingness that a Form 1040 does not gather. For instance, a taxpayer
cannot report if she has received nonmarket income, such an intrafamily
transfers or gifts.72 She also cannot report if she has savings or wealth that
she can consume (aside from any realized gains). In-kind support is also
unreported. For instance, if a taxpayer has wealthy parents who provide
her with housing or food, this is invisible to the IRS. A tax return also
does not gather information about imputed income—that is, consumption
arising from a person’s assets or from their own nonmarket labor. Imputed
income includes the rental value of a person’s home, or the market value
of childcare provided by a stay-at-home spouse.
In addition to unreported income, a tax return does not—or perhaps
cannot—gather more holistic information about a taxpayer’s financial
circumstances. For instance, a taxpayer cannot explain why she is not working.
The tax return does not distinguish between someone who chooses not to
work and someone who cannot work for reasons outside of their control.
Regarding children, a tax return does not seek to determine who is a child’s
primary caregiver or their primary source of financial support.
A Form 1040 capably gathers the information necessary to determine
taxable income. However, determining a person’s deservingness for public
support is necessarily a more complicated evaluation. Because the information
on a Form 1040 is sparse, the IRS must use certain pieces of information
as proxies for deservingness. For instance, rather than undertaking an indepth evaluation of whether someone is faultless, the IRS simply asks
whether there are children in the home.73 To ensure that the correct adult
claims each child, the Form 1040 and Schedule EIC capture whether there
are closely related children in the taxpayer’s home for at least six months.74
Similarly, rather than undertaking an in-depth evaluation of reciprocity or
work effort, the IRS can only observe whether someone works in the formal
labor market. A person is deemed deserving if she works as an employee
or if she is self-employed. Unpaid work in someone’s home or community
does not count. Retraining or applying for work does not count.

72. Gifts over $15,000 in 2021 must be reported on a gift tax return, but this is
separate from the Form 1040 and therefore not used in determining eligibility for tax credits.
73. A child is someone under the age of 17 for the CTC, IRC § 24, or 19 for the
EITC (24 for students), § 152(c)(3). For the EITC, a child can be any age if she is permanently
and totally disabled. Id.
74. I.R.S., Schedule EIC, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040sei.pdf [https://perma.cc/
XW3M-ELXK] (last visited Nov. 23, 2021).
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Based on this sparse information, only people who work in the formal
labor market are deemed deserving of refundable tax credits. Those who
live with closely related children for most of the year receive the bulk of
support, as they are eligible for both the CTC and the larger EITC for
working families with children. Working adults without children receive
only the smaller childless EITC. Although these outcomes will significantly
overlap with a “true deservingness” evaluation, there will be some misalignment,
as the next section explains.
B. Who is Missing?
The tax system is well equipped to distribute cash to households, but it
is not well equipped to determine deservingness based on all the characteristics
that go into such an evaluation. As discussed above, deservingness is
largely based on faultlessness as well as reciprocal effort. Therefore, if
someone is faultless for their situation and puts forth significant effort,
they should be considered deserving. Yet there are many people in the
United States who would likely be considered deserving even under a relatively
exacting deservingness evaluation, but who are excluded from tax-administered
public benefits because their deservingness is not reflected on a Form
1040.
This section shares the stories of several individuals who were excluded
from public benefits because their deservingness cannot be reflected on a
tax return. These stories are anonymized amalgams of several clients I
represented while directing the low-income taxpayer clinic at Bet Tzedek
Legal Service in Los Angeles. The names and details have been changed
sufficiently so that specific individuals cannot be identified.
These stories are obviously anecdotal. It is possible that the number of
people who face similar circumstances is quite small. I am not seeking to
argue that such exclusion is significant in magnitude. Rather, I only aim
to show that the inputs to a deservingness evaluation and the information
gathered on a Form 1040 misalign in meaningful ways. The necessary
result of this mismatch is that some people who would be deemed deserving
under a more holistic evaluation will be excluded from tax-administered
public benefits.
Brenda worked for decades as an in-home health aide. Her last contract
ended several years ago; she has been unable to find additional work.
Because she worked as an independent contractor, she was not eligible for
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unemployment insurance at the time.75 Now in her mid-fifties, Brenda
cannot undertake physically challenging work but is too young to begin
receiving Social Security retirement benefits. Brenda also has a mild
intellectual disability, but it is not severe enough to qualify her for disability
benefits. Brenda volunteers at church. She also supports her adult son who
was recently released from incarceration and has been unable to find work.
Brenda is not responsible for her situation. She has been a hard worker
her entire life and wants to be working now. No one will hire her, despite
her best efforts. Despite her faultlessness and efforts, Brenda will not be
eligible for any antipoverty support delivered through the tax system.
Ivan is a legal permanent resident with a Social Security number valid
for work in the United States. He moved to the United States as a child
along with his family in the 1970s. Ivan’s brother has a severe mental and
physical disability that prevents him from being able to care for himself.
Ivan is his brother’s only close relative and his sole caretaker. Ivan owned
a small corner market for many years, but he was forced to close his store
in 2019 after losing customers to grocery-delivery apps. He cannot find
more remunerative work because he must return home to feed, clean, and
move his brother regularly. Unfortunately, Ivan’s brother is undocumented
and is therefore not eligible for any programs that provide financial support
to individuals with disabilities.
By any reasonable interpretation of the theories of distributive justice
that explain the organization of the U.S. social safety net, Ivan is deserving.
He is not responsible for his brother’s disability, nor his brother’s immigration
status. He is also a hard worker by any definition of the concept. He cares
for his brother and is desperate for work. He simply has not been able to
find a job that would allow him to care for his brother. Because Ivan does
not work, he will not be eligible for any support delivered through the tax
system.
Caitlyn and her cousin were raised in the same home and grew up like
siblings. Caitlyn’s cousin has been incarcerated for the past year, and Caitlyn
is caring for her two children until she is released. Caitlyn supports her
cousin’s children financially, takes them to school, supervises their daily
activities, and so forth. Although she is low-income, Caitlyn cannot claim
her cousin’s children for the purpose of the EITC or CTC because she is
not their parent, grandparent, aunt, or sibling.76

75. She may have been misclassified as an independent contractor but was not
aware of her rights and did not challenge the decision at the time.
76. In some states, Caitlyn might be able to claim the children for the purposes of
SNAP and TANF if she meets the programs’ other eligibility requirements. See 7 C.F.R.
§ 273.1(b)(1)(iii); LINDA GIANNARELLI, CHRISTINE HEFFERNAN, SARAH MINTON, MEGAN
THOMPSON & KATHRYN STEVENS, OFF. OF P LAN., RSCH. & EVALUATION, DEP’T OF HEALTH
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In this case, both Caitlyn and the children should be considered deserving
of support. Even so, the entire household will be excluded from the CTC
and the larger EITC for families with children because the child-claiming
rules are too restrictive to allow Caitlyn to claim the children. Caitlyn
would qualify for the childless EITC, but this credit is so small that it does
not even fully offset the federal taxes that Caitlyn will pay.
Ivan, Brenda, and Caitlyn’s households should be considered deserving
under an evaluation of true deservingness. None of them is responsible for
his or her situation; all of them are hard workers. Yet, our primary mechanism
for distributing cash antipoverty support—the tax system—cannot ascertain
such deservingness. Rather, it uses market income as a proxy for effort
and defines childcare relationships narrowly. As a result, it overlooks the
deservingness of certain individuals and households, many of whom are
particularly vulnerable.
C. Additional Context
When I describe stories such as these in an academic setting, colleagues
sometimes voice versions of the following two comments. The first is
skepticism over my clients’ alleged inability to find work. The second is
skepticism that anyone can truly live with no income. These are reasonable
concerns. Indeed, I had them myself, which led me to interrogate my clients
quite rigorously. As a brief digression, I offer here a few thoughts on these
points.
Regarding the lack of employment, I noticed several common patterns
among my clients who were unable to find work. Many were caring for
relatives with disabilities who could not qualify for disability benefits, either
because they were undocumented, or because the disabilities were difficult to
substantiate. For instance, mental health conditions can be difficult to
document. My clients’ caretaking duties made looking for work difficult.
Additionally, although my clients never mentioned it themselves, I am
certain that ageism and racism played a role in many cases.
Regarding the question of how someone can survive with no income,
there are three possible implications of such an inquiry. The first, and least
charitable, is that my clients misrepresented their financial situations.
& HUM. SERVS., OPRE REPORT 2017-82, WELFARE RULES DATABOOK: STATE TANF
POLICIES AS OF JULY 2016, at 68–69 tbl.I.B.9 (2017), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/
files/publication/95251/welfare_rules_databook_state_tanf_policies_as_of_july_2016_1.
pdf [https://perma.cc/72EH-BT5N].
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Perhaps some of my clients did so, but it is unlikely that all my clients in
similar circumstances lied about their situations. They had to provide me
with extensive documentation of their financial circumstances, and I
almost never found a discrepancy between what they told me and their
financial records. If I had found a discrepancy, I would not have kept them
as clients.
A second possible implication is that income is a poor proxy for wellbeing,
and that we should look instead at their consumption. If someone has food
and shelter, their consumption is not $0, even if their income is $0. For
instance, although they were excluded from cash benefits, these clients
were typically still eligible for SNAP benefits. For these reasons, some
might feel that describing these clients’ income as $0 is misleading. This
question could thus be another way of stating a preference for a consumptionbased measure of human wellbeing.77 Fair enough. I agree that their consumption
could not have been $0. Specifically, it’s likely that my clients were able
to obtain food, both because of SNAP benefits as well as food pantries.78
Even so, I am certain that they lived in situations of extreme deprivation.
The fact that they were not suffering from acute starvation did little to
assuage my concern for their wellbeing.
Of course, the third possible intention is genuine curiosity and concern.
In truth, most of my clients survived without income because they found
themselves in unusually desperate, temporary circumstances. To get by,
they sold their belongings. They took help from their churches or synagogues.
They slept on friends’ couches. They begged their landlords for mercy.
Eventually, in the fortunate cases, something would give—they would find
work, or perhaps qualify for SSI. If they had been able to receive some
limited cash support, it likely would have partly ameliorated the long-term
traumatic consequences of these periods of scarcity.
IV. OUTCOMES AND ALTERNATIVES
A. Does Inequality of Deservingness Matter?
This Essay has described two kinds of inequality of deservingness, one
of “true deservingness” and the other of “deemed deservingness.” Inequality
of true deservingness is something that exists in the abstract. It refers to
77. See BRUCE D. MEYER & JAMES X. SULLIVAN, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INST., ANNUAL
REPORT ON U.S. CONSUMPTION P OVERTY : 2016 at 2 (2017), https://www.aei.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/meyer_sullivan_consumption_poverty_report_2016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LJ76-5C6G] (explaining why consumption offers a superior measure of wellbeing
compared to income).
78. Bet Tzedek Legal Services operates in partnership with food pantries throughout
Los Angeles. Many of my clients found my services by visiting such pantries.
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the idea that some people are more deserving of support than others under
various distributive justice norms. Looking to organizing principles underlying
U.S. antipoverty programs, deservingness in the U.S. is primarily based
on faultlessness as well as shared effort or reciprocity. Children are deserving;
people with disabilities are deserving; workers may be deserving, depending
on their work effort.
Does it matter that some people may be more “deserving” than others
in abstract terms? Perhaps it does. Some might feel pride or shame if they
internalize deservingness norms and if they fall inside or outside of the
preferred group. Moreover, there might be some positive consequences of
inequality of true deservingness. For instance, it might drive people to
work harder, to contribute to the community, and to avoid bad choices that
would make them responsible for their misfortune.
Inequality of deemed deservingness has more tangible outcomes: Some
people will receive safety net benefits and some will not. In any non-universal
benefit system, such an outcome is unavoidable. Does such inequality of
deemed deservingness matter? Well, it certainly matters to those who are
affected. It might also incentivize certain behavior, like obtaining formal
employment. However, to the extent that these outcomes reflect the
deservingness norms that broadly organize the distribution of antipoverty
benefits, we might not be overly concerned. Excluding the undeserving is
precisely what non-universal programs seek to do.
Thus, inequality of true deservingness and inequality of deemed
deservingness, on their own, might only merit limited concern. Rather,
it is the incongruity between inequality of true deservingness and inequality
of deemed deservingness that matters. In other words, the larger problem
is that those who receive or are excluded from benefits are not necessarily
the correct people.
Why might such misalignment of norms and outcomes matter? For one,
outcomes are somewhat unprincipled. Whether someone is deemed deserving
under the tax system does not depend on their faultlessness or work effort,
but rather on whether their deservingness is reflected on their Form 1040.
This, in turn, depends on what information the IRS can readily see or assess.
This information is necessarily limited to easily observable things like earned
income and family size, rather than one’s character, effort, or behavior.
The misalignment between norms and outcomes might also create
misaligned incentives. One possible reason to redistribute to deserving
individuals is to incentivize virtuous behavior. Regarding reciprocity, for
instance, we might hope to incentivize people to contribute to society in a
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meaningful way, to make the world a better place. However, by looking
only to formal employment, we incentivize only formal employment. Not
all formal employment serves widely accepted public goals. Consider
someone who works for a company that provides predatory lending services
to low-income borrowers. A low-wage employee in such a company
would receive work-linked tax credits, even though their work may cause
more harm than good. Meanwhile, public benefit work requirements create
disincentives for positive community engagement outside the formal labor
market, like caring for children or parents, or volunteering, since these
entail the opportunity cost of foregone formal labor.
It is worth noting that some might favor work requirements not because
formal employment helps society but rather because they believe that it
helps workers. Formal employment generates income, builds marketable
skills, and might have more abstract effects on workers like imposing
discipline. While these things may be true, other activities might have the
same or better result. For instance, attending school also creates marketable
skills and imposes discipline, but would not qualify someone for the EITC.
Further, many low-wage jobs do not create marketable skills, and some
might expose workers to labor abuses that outweigh other positives. More
abstractly, deciding how someone should spend their time is paternalistic
and fails to consider that people might know best how to maximize their
own wellbeing and that of their family.
Lastly, the mismatch between norms and outcomes might undermine
faith in government as well as public support for antipoverty programs. If
someone sees deserving people excluded from support while undeserving
people receive benefits, they might feel that government assistance is
poorly managed, even corrupt. Such perceptions might lead to apathy,
voter fatigue, or other outcomes that undermine democratic participation.
More positively, however, such perceptions might merely encourage frustrated
voters to oust incumbent politicians.
B. What are the Alternatives?
One way to equalize deemed deservingness is to provide universal
benefits to everyone—such as via a universal basic income—or at least
everyone below a certain income level. Another is to provide benefits to
no one. Either solution would treat all possible claimants equally. Both
solutions, however, ignore the problem of misalignment between true and
deemed deservingness. Indeed, both solutions would exacerbate this
misalignment.
The theoretically ideal solution to misalignment of true and deemed
deservingness is to create an antipoverty program that accurately tracks
true deservingness. However, designing eligibility rules for a single program
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that anticipates all possible conditions of deservingness would be exceedingly
challenging. To do so through the tax system using information simple
enough to report on a Form 1040 would likely be impossible. The range
of possible circumstances is simply too large. Moreover, true deservingness
depends upon a person’s personal history, capacity, and intentions, all of
which would be impossible to report on a paper form with any degree of
credibility.
Small improvements to the current rules are certainly possible. For
instance, rather than using bright-line child-claiming rules based on blood
relationships and residency, the EITC and CTC could provide benefits to
claimants based on a care-giving standard. Such a standard would allow
someone to claim a child for tax credits if she supervises the child’s daily
activities, transports the child to school and doctors’ appointments, takes
part in the child’s educational activities, provides financial support to the
child, and so forth.
Specific reforms notwithstanding, it would be difficult to design and
enforce tax benefits based entirely on holistic standards rather than brightline rules. In order to accommodate all circumstances of deservingness, both
rules and standards would need to anticipate countless different possible
circumstances. Additionally, standards are often indeterminate for claimants
and costly for agencies to administer.
In truth, the current system as applied by the IRS may be a somewhat
acceptable middle ground. Many deserving households are included, and
at low administrative cost. Moreover, as I mentioned above, it is possible
that there are relatively few excluded households, nearly all of which have
complex and highly individualized circumstances. Some would-be claimants
might care for disabled family members, have difficult-to-document disabilities
themselves, or need job retraining.
Rather than designing a one-size-fits-all tax-based antipoverty program,
perhaps this discussion counsels toward expanding non-tax antipoverty
programs to ensure better coverage of the diverse circumstances of need.
In recent years, policymakers have shown a penchant for distributing support
through the tax system rather than via non-tax programs.79 For instance,
while Congress has expanded the EITC regularly over the past several

79.

See Low-End Regressivity, supra note 1, at 125–26.
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decades,80 it has not increased TANF funding since 1996.81 Unfortunately,
as this Essay has explained, the tax system’s ability to determine need and
deservingness is limited in fundamental ways. Meanwhile, programs like
SNAP, TANF, and SSI already have the infrastructure to collect detailed
information about claimants, including conducting one-on-one interviews.
While certainly non-tax programs have their own drawbacks, these programs
at least have the theoretical capacity to assess more complex individualized
circumstances. For instance, SSI eligibility could be expanded to include
a wider range of cognitive disabilities and mental health conditions. Doing
so would likely provide significant support to nonworking individuals,
both with and without children.
Local antipoverty programs can also work as a complement to (not a
replacement for) federal programs. For instance, General Relief (GR) programs
have historically supported struggling individuals who do not qualify
under other federal and state programs.82 GR programs are operated locally,
usually at the county level, and allow for more individualized determinations
of need.83 The number of states with GR programs has been steadily
dropping over the past several decades, along with the amount of benefits
the programs provide.84 Expanding GR programs’ reach and support is
one piecemeal way to address the problems identified herein.
The COVID-19 pandemic led to the creation of new local public benefit
programs that took individual circumstances into account. These local
programs offered financial support to struggling households affected by
the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic fallout. Their application
processes often inquired into households’ specific circumstances. For instance,
LA County offered rental support to both renters and landlords affected
by the pandemic.85 Eligibility was based on income, and the program
prioritized those most at risk of eviction.86
Similar local support programs could target those who are ineligible for
other forms of support, but who are actively seeking work, caring for family
members, or are otherwise engaged in meaningful community activities.
Local programs that operate through caseworker discretion might be
particularly promising, as caseworkers can form relationships with claimants
80. E.g. American Rescue Plan Act, P.L. 117-2, § 9621.
81. CBPP, supra note 28, at 2. Because TANF program funding is not even adjusted for
inflation, its real value has fallen by 40% over the past 25 years. Id.
82. Schott & Hill, supra note 7.
83. See L.A. County Dept. of Health & Hum. Serv., General Relief, https://dpss.
lacounty.gov/en/cash/gr.html [https://perma.cc/6S8A-YVK8] (last visited Nov. 23, 2021).
84. Schott & Hill, supra note 7.
85. 211LA, L.A. County COVID-19 Rent Relief, https://211la.org/lacounty/rentrelief
[https://perma.cc/6MH6-W6NY] (last visited Nov. 23, 2021).
86. Id.
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and make determinations based on deeper knowledge of an individual’s
circumstances. Although decentralization can lead to disparate outcomes,
as long as existing federal programs continue in their current form, outcomes
among expanded local programs can only improve on the current situation.
V. CONCLUSION
This Essay has offered a framework for how to think about exclusion
from antipoverty programs. By finding space between true deservingness
and deemed deservingness, I have sought to show that not all those
excluded from support ought to be excluded under the norms that broadly
define the boundaries of such programs.
Throughout this Essay, I have assumed that redistributive norms
should and do inform the administration of antipoverty programs. I fear,
however, that the opposite is more accurate. Perhaps the administrative
realities of antipoverty programs shape our collective redistributive norms.
For instance, because only those with formal employment receive support,
perhaps only formal job market participation is seen as true deservingness.
Such a reversal of norms and design would lead to a meager notion of
deservingness, shaped by a system that was not originally designed to
evaluate such things.
Above all, I hope to have shown that the circumstances of need and
deservingness in the United States are diverse. We do a disservice to each
other when we forget this.
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